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I. Introduction
When United States citizens initiate legal action against a
foreign entity, they face a significant jurisdictional obstacle—the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 1 The FSIA provides a
general grant of immunity to foreign states and their
instrumentalities from United States court jurisdiction; 2 however,
it establishes a number of exceptions where a foreign sovereign’s
acts are subject to adjudication in the United States. 3 Prior to the
FSIA, the United States exercised absolute sovereign immunity,
leaving any citizen injured by foreign state action with no remedy. 4
But increased international commerce during the twentieth
century led to the application of a more restrictive interpretation
of immunity and the adoption of the FSIA’s commercial activities
exception. 5 The commercial activities exception contains three
clauses, each providing grounds for lifting a foreign state’s
immunity when a state’s commercial act impacts the United
States. 6 This Note examines the third clause of the commercial
activities exception—the “direct effect” clause. The direct effect
clause provides an exception to the grant of immunity for “an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and
of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607 (outlining exceptions in addition to the
commercial activities exception, including waiver, state-sponsored terrorism, and
noncommercial tortious activity).
4. See infra Part III.A (discussing the international law principles behind
the theory of absolute sovereign immunity).
5. See infra Part III.B (discussing the political motivations for codifying the
application of restrictive sovereign immunity).
6. See infra notes 183–187 (detailing the three clauses of the commercial
activities exception and the jurisdictional requirements for each clause).
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commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.” 7
Interpreting the direct effect clause has created confusion
among the courts—particularly when determining the clause’s
personal jurisdiction requirements. 8 Initial interpretations of the
direct effect clause divided courts on what constituted a “direct
effect” in the United States. The first theory required that an
activity caused an effect that was “substantial and foreseeable,”
while the second theory evaluated if the effect was “sufficiently
direct” that Congress would have wanted a United States court to
hear the case. 9 In its attempt to provide clarity on the clause’s
scope, the Supreme Court held in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 10 that “an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s activity.” 11
While the Weltover holding established criteria for acts
constituting a “direct effect,” the opinion remained silent on the
clause’s personal jurisdiction implications. 12 In Weltover, both
parties raised the issue of applying a minimum contacts analysis,
established by the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 13
which requires that an entity have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state before that state’s court can assert personal
jurisdiction. 14 Ultimately, the Court did not determine if the direct
effect clause required a minimum contacts analysis; rather, it
declined to address the issue and left the question open. 15
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
8. See infra Part IV (outlining various courts’ interpretations of the
meaning of direct effect and the clause’s personal jurisdiction requirements).
9. See infra Part IV.A (detailing the circuit split resulting from courts’
initial interpretations of the direct effect clause).
10. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
11. Id. at 618.
12. See infra Part IV.A (discussing that some circuits adopted additional
requirements of substantiality and foreseeability).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. See id. at 316 (stating that due process required minimum contacts “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice’” (citations omitted)).
15. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (“Assuming, without deciding, that a
foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause, we find that
Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the constitutional
test.”).
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Following Weltover, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits split in their
interpretations of the direct effect clause’s personal jurisdiction
requirement. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in Corzo v. Banco Central
de Reserva del Peru 16 analyzed the personal jurisdiction element
by extending due process protection to a Peruvian government
bank. 17 The court determined that asserting personal jurisdiction
required a nexus between the activity of the foreign state and the
cause of action—that connection required satisfying the minimum
contacts test. 18 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the structure, purpose, and legislative history of the
FSIA. 19 Contrarily, in 2016, the Sixth Circuit concluded in Rote v.
Zel Custom Manufacturing LLC 20 that a foreign state did not need
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction under the direct effect
clause. 21 The court found that the phrase “causes a direct effect in
the United States” unambiguous, 22 and because it could resolve the
issue by applying the plain language of the statute, examining the
FSIA’s legislative history was unnecessary. 23
The question explored in this Note is whether, under the direct
effect clause of the FSIA commercial activities exception, a foreign
sovereign must have minimum contacts with the United States in
order for a U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction over the entity.
Examining personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the
direct effect clause requires exploring the interaction between
constitutional law and principles of international law. The
16. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).
17. See id. at 525–26 (concluding that personal jurisdiction under the direct
effect clause incorporates a minimum contacts analysis).
18. See id. at 526 (determining that a foreign state had insufficient contacts
with the United States, so jurisdiction was improper and any incidental effects
were irrelevant).
19. See id. at 523 (noting that the ”waiver exception to sovereign immunity
must be narrowly construed”).
20. 816 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016).
21. See id. at 394 (stating that following a minimum contacts analysis adds
an unnecessary requirement to the statute).
22. See id. at 395 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit went beyond the plain
meaning of the FSIA’s terms by reading in additional statutory requirements).
23. See id. at 392–93 (stating that even if the court looked at the legislative
history, the minimum contacts argument was still unpersuasive as it merely
added “‘unexpressed requirement[s],’ rather than resolve any inherent
ambiguity” (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
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minimum contacts analysis highlights the tension between
applying constitutional due process protection to a foreign state,
while simultaneously asserting jurisdiction over its commercial
activities. Denying jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the
Due Process Clause may defeat the intent of the FSIA’s immunity
exceptions created to provide relief for U.S. plaintiffs injured by
foreign states. Deciding questions of personal jurisdiction over
foreign entities requires identifying the goals of foreign sovereign
immunity, why the FSIA established exceptions to that immunity,
and what constitutional protections the United States should
provide to foreign states.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II of this Note examines
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause and how courts
have applied due process protections to nontraditional entities. 24
Part III discusses the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity,
concerns that led Congress to pass the FSIA, and the purpose of
the commercial activities exception. 25 Part IV explains the current
circuit split involving the minimum contacts requirement
following the guidance from the Supreme Court in Weltover. 26
Part V concludes by arguing that recognizing foreign sovereigns as
“persons” under the Due Process Clause is improper, and that
reading a minimum contacts test into the direct effect clause is
contrary to the structure and intent of the FSIA commercial
activities exception. 27
II. Applying Due Process Protections to Foreign States
The minimum contacts test established in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 28 provides protection against unconstitutional
24. See infra Part II (detailing how courts have applied due process
protection to foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states).
25. See infra Part III (discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity and its impact of the development of the commercial activities
exception).
26. See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split over whether a
minimum contacts test is required to assert personal jurisdiction under the direct
effect clause).
27. See infra Part V (arguing that the statutory provisions in the FSIA
provide the appropriate personal jurisdiction criteria).
28. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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exercises of personal jurisdiction. Deciding if a minimum contacts
analysis is relevant to a foreign state requires examining what
protections a foreign state receives under the Due Process Clause.
The critical determination is whether a foreign state is a “person”
for purposes of due process. This Part examines personal
jurisdiction applied to nontraditional “persons” and what
constitutional protections, if any, should apply to foreign states.
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Minimum Contacts Test
Established in International Shoe
Before discussing the application of a minimum contacts test
to a foreign entity, it is helpful to examine the origin of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine. Personal jurisdiction developed under a
theory of territorialism—that a state’s borders defined the limits
of its jurisdiction. 29 Strict territorialism proved difficult to apply as
modern commerce evolved to include cross-border transactions,
leading the Supreme Court to adopt a more flexible standard to
accommodate increasing interstate commerce. 30
1. The Territorial Approach to Jurisdiction Prior to International
Shoe
Prior to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, personal jurisdiction in the United States was settled
under common law, which was rooted in international law
principles. 31 Common law rested on a theory of territorial
29. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8–9
(2006) (describing that jurisdiction was based on the theory that each sovereign
had jurisdiction to bind persons and things within its physical borders).
30. See Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World:
Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction
Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1506–07 (2006) (discussing that the modern
changes in transportation and communication prompted the Supreme Court to
expand jurisdiction).
31. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 872 (1989) (discussing that applying
common law principles was appealing to courts because its straightforward
application yielded consistent results).
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jurisdiction—that each sovereign had jurisdiction over the people
and property within its physical borders. 32 The only constitutional
provision relevant to jurisdiction was the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requiring one state to recognize another state’s final
judgment. 33 But the Clause did not carry significant weight
against the common law territorial personal jurisdiction restraint.
The Supreme Court determined in D’Arcy v. Ketchum 34 that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not modify the common law
limitations on enforcing another state’s judgement. 35 Following
D’Arcy, the Clause was understood as an exception to the common
law, not a provision which defeated the international principles of
territorialism. 36
In 1877, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff 37
reinforced the idea of territorial jurisdiction. 38 Pennoyer concerned
the validity of a default judgment entered by an Oregon state court
where it asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even
though he was neither a resident nor a domicile of that state. 39 The
Court recognized that following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a party could challenge this type of judgment on the
ground that it violated due process for a court to determine rights
and obligations of parties not subject to its jurisdiction. 40 The
32. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that under international law,
territorial jurisdiction came about as an important limit on independent
sovereigns’ actions towards each other).
33. See id. at 8–9 (arguing that constitutional law had no bearing on
jurisdiction).
34. 52 U.S. 165 (1850).
35. See id. at 174 (determining that personal jurisdiction was proper when
it conformed with well-established rules of international law).
36. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68
IOWA L. REV 1015, 1025 (1983) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did
not displace international law as the original source of jurisdictional rules).
37. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
38. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 11 (“As a result [of Pennoyer], presence
within a forum state’s territorial borders became the sine qua non standard for
personal jurisdiction.”).
39. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719 (outlining the Oregon statute that allowed
for personal service on an individual’s property).
40. See id. at 734 (“[D]ue process of law would require appearance or
personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment
rendered.”).
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Court determined that the Oregon state judgment was void—a
plaintiff could only serve a nonresident defendant when the
defendant was within the state’s boundaries. 41
While the Pennoyer decision reinforced the principles of
territorial sovereignty found in international law, the Court
accomplished this by grounding its decision in the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby associating territoriality with constitutional
doctrine. 42 “Pennoyer v. Neff thus established the principle that a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit only if it satisfies the
requirements of the Due Process Clause, for if it does not meet
those requirements it is not properly enforceable even within the
State which rendered it.” 43
2. International Shoe and the Minimum Contacts Requirement
The rise of corporations and an increase in interstate
transactions made it difficult for courts in applying the rigid
territorial principles set forth in Pennoyer. 44 Because corporations
existed as separate “fictional” legal entities, courts initially
recognized that the corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction
only in its state of incorporation. 45 However, as corporations
increasingly conducted business across state lines, multiple states
developed an interest in asserting personal jurisdiction over their
commercial activity. 46 As a result of the rise of interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court adopted a less territorial approach
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 47—a state may assert
41. See id. at 733 (distinguishing the requirement for proceedings impacting
personal rights from in rem proceedings where the nature of the proceeding
impacts a nonresidents property within the forum state).
42. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 10 (discussing that territorialism shaped
the Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction).
43. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 573 (1958).
44. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 107 (2010) (stating that narrow territorial jurisdiction rules
were “too inflexible to govern the modern reality of interstate corporate
business”).
45. See id. (discussing the initial limitations on personal jurisdiction over
corporations).
46. See id. (noting that states other than the state of incorporation sought to
adjudicate claims arising from corporations’ activities).
47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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personal jurisdiction over a corporation, but only if the entity
maintains sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. 48
In International Shoe, the Court had to determine if a
Delaware corporation was subject to Washington state court
jurisdiction because of its activities in Washington, and if so, if that
jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause. 49 The
defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal
place of business in Missouri. 50 While it maintained places of
business in other states, it did not have an office in Washington
and made no contracts for sale or purchase of merchandise in the
state. 51 During a period of three years, the corporation employed
thirteen salespeople who resided in Washington. 52 These
employees generated $31,000 each year in commission based on
activities solely within Washington. 53 These employees had
authority to solicit orders from prospective buyers at prices fixed
by the corporation, but they had no authority to enter into
contracts or make collections on the corporation’s behalf. 54 The
Washington-based salespeople transmitted orders to the
corporation’s principal place of business in Missouri, and all
merchandise was shipped from outside of Washington to the
purchaser within the state. 55
The commissioner of the state unemployment compensation
fund issued an order and notice of assessment of delinquent
contributions under a statute requiring employers to contribute to

48. See id. at 316 (stating that a corporation’s presence can only manifest
through the acts of its authorized agents).
49. See id. at 311 (outlining the claim concerning unpaid contributions to
Washington’s unemployment compensation fund).
50. See id. at 313 (detailing the corporation’s footwear manufacturing and
sales operation).
51. See id. (stating that the corporation maintained places of business
outside of Washington for manufacturing and distribution).
52. See id. (noting that these salespeople were the corporation’s only agents
in Washington).
53. See id. (discussing that while the salespeople lived in Washington, they
reported to supervisors in Missouri).
54. See id. (stating that the employees had limited authority to act for the
corporation).
55. See id. (discussing how the corporation filled orders from Washington
customers).
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the state’s fund. 56 The statute authorized the commissioner to
serve notice on an employer through personal service if the
employer was in the state, or alternatively to mail it to the last
known address. 57 The commissioner served notice on one of the
sales agents located in Washington, and also mailed a copy to the
corporation’s headquarters in Missouri. 58 International Shoe
moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment, claiming
that it neither had authorized agents in Washington, nor
conducted business in the state. 59 According to the corporation, it
did not maintain sufficient activities in Washington, so subjecting
it to the state court’s jurisdiction violated due process. 60
Applying the minimum contacts standard, the Court
determined that the activities on behalf of the corporation in
Washington were “neither irregular nor casual.” 61 The corporation
maintained continuous activities in Washington which provided it
with great financial benefit. 62 Accordingly, because the corporation
received the benefit of state law protections over its activities, it
must answer to the state’s courts when it adjudicates a matter
arising from those acts. 63 The corporation had “sufficient contacts
or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which
appellant has incurred there.” 64
56. See id. at 311 (noting that the state of Washington administered this
unemployment fund).
57. See id. at 312 (describing the statutory requirements for service on an
employer to notify it of the commissioner’s assessment of delinquent
contributions).
58. See id. (noting that either method alone satisfied proper service).
59. See id. (stating that International Shoe argued that it did not meet the
statutory definition of an employer).
60. See id. at 315 (noting that International Shoe further argued that
because it was not present in the state, Washington’s fine assessment violated
due process).
61. See id. at 320 (describing the corporation’s presence in Washington as
systematic and continuous).
62. See id. (noting that the corporation obtained significant interstate
business from its operations in Washington).
63. See id. (discussing that the state court had jurisdiction because the claim
arose from continuous activities in Washington).
64. Id.
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The Court recognized that the territorial principles set forth
in Pennoyer led to an outdated analysis when applied to modern,
interstate corporations. 65 Chief Justice Stone set out the new
minimum contacts standard, stating that:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 66

The minimum contacts standard stemmed from careful
consideration of unique corporate factors rendering a territorial
analysis of personal jurisdiction imprecise. First, although a
corporation “exists” only as a legal fiction, its “presence” can only
be determined by the actions of its authorized agents. 67 Second,
“presence” in a state is satisfied where a corporation operates
continuously, but casual or isolated activities do not support a
finding of general jurisdiction. 68 Finally, even if a corporation has
insufficient acts in the state to establish general jurisdiction,
certain acts by their nature subject the corporation to the
jurisdiction of the forum state. 69
These considerations led to the Court’s conclusion that using
states’ physical boundaries to scrutinize a corporation’s due
process protections for purposes of personal jurisdiction produced
an inaccurate analysis. 70 Rather, a due process analysis turned on
65. See id. at 316 (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.” (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 (1877))).
66. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
67. See id. (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem
to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”).
68. See id. at 317 (“[I]t has been generally recognized that the casual
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of
activities in a state [on] the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to
suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”).
69. See id. at 318 (“[D]ecisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have
been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service
and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state through the acts of
its authorized agents.”).
70. See id. at 319 (“It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the
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“the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure.” 71 Following International Shoe, an
inquiry into personal jurisdiction focused on the relationship
between the forum state, the defendant, and the nature of the
underlying claim; sovereign territorial authority, while not
irrelevant, took a subordinate role in the analysis. 72
B. Foreign States’ Right to Due Process
Before a court may hear a case, it must have both subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. 73
While subject matter jurisdiction is typically determined by
statute or the nature of the claim, 74 personal jurisdiction involves
considerations of fairness towards the defendant. 75 In a claim
involving a foreign entity, a finding of minimum contacts satisfies
the due process requirements for specific jurisdiction. 76 When the

boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative.”).
71. Id.
72. See Parrish, supra note 29, at 13 (describing that International Shoe
signaled a dramatic shift in jurisdiction theory).
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (requiring dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
74. See Pauline Whittinghill Klyce Pennoyer, A New Frontera: Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, Arbitral Awards and a Waive Goodbye to Assets, 49 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 115, 120 (describing subject matter jurisdiction as more clearly
determinable).
75. See id. at 121 (“While the [personal jurisdiction] doctrine has evolved
over several centuries, basic concerns of fundamental fairness toward the
defendant remain at its center.”).
76. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984)
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and
the foreign corporation.
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defendant is a private party, a finding of either general or specific
jurisdiction suffices. 77
When Congress drafted the FSIA, it imposed specific
exceptions to a foreign state’s general immunity. Federal district
courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over these civil
claims when an FSIA exception applies. 78 The court is only
required to determine that the foreign state’s action giving rise to
the claim qualifies under one of the express statutory exceptions. 79
Additionally, courts have personal jurisdiction over a state so long
as service is made consistent with the requirements set out in the
Act. 80 Beyond these statutory grants of jurisdiction, courts have
come to varying conclusions about whether the FSIA imposes
additional requirements. 81
Determining whether a foreign state is entitled to
constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause is
essential to determining if the direct effect clause of the
commercial activities exception requires minimum contacts for
personal jurisdiction. 82 The Supreme Court avoided addressing
this issue in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 83 In Weltover,
the Court did not address the question of minimum contacts
because it found the issue irrelevant provided that the foreign
77. See id. (discussing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction . . . against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as
to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 . . . .”).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012) (providing the statutory grounds for
subject matter jurisdiction).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012) (“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608
of this title.”).
81. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582
F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (determining that foreign instrumentalities are not
afforded Due Process Clause protections); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that safeguards under
the Due Process Clause are inapplicable to foreign states); Tex. Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (finding that a constitutional due process analysis supports
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state).
82. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the minimum
contacts test).
83. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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sovereign had clearly established minimum contacts with the
United States, making the inquiry unnecessary. 84 Deciding
whether the FSIA requires minimum contacts for jurisdiction has
led to ambiguity and inconsistent application. 85 In several
decisions following Weltover, courts have held that the
minimum contacts test is inapplicable as foreign states are not
entitled to constitutional protection. 86
An entity must qualify as a “person” before it receives
protection under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has
interpreted “person” more broadly to include entities other than
human beings. 87 While the Supreme Court has never clearly
addressed a foreign state’s right to due process, courts have ruled
on related issues: foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states.
First, courts have regularly recognized that a foreign private
corporation is a “person” for purposes of due process. 88 The
Supreme Court applied this corporate personhood analysis in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 89 determining
that the foreign corporation’s contacts with the state of Texas were
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 90 The Colombian
84. See id. at 619 (“Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a
‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause . . . we find that Argentina
possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the constitutional test.”).
85. See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split on incorporating a
minimum contacts test).
86. See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he ‘commercial activity’ inquiry under the FSIA is not congruent with a
general personal jurisdiction inquiry . . . .”); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266
Fed. App’x. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (determining that foreign states are not protected
by the Fifth Amendment); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44,
57 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Foreign sovereigns cannot use the constitutional constraints of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to shield themselves from large
punitive damages awards under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act terrorism
exception . . . .”).
87. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987)
(evaluating a foreign corporation’s right to due process).
88. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?:
Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 136 (2001) (stating that while it is clear that a
foreign corporation is a person for due process purposes, “the rationale for this
proposition has gone unexplained”).
89. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
90. See id. at 418 (determining that the brief presence of the corporation’s
employees in Texas were insignificant).
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corporation, Helicol, crashed a helicopter while working on a
Peruvian pipeline, killing four U.S. citizens in the accident. 91 The
decedents were employed by a Peruvian company, Consorcio, that
contracted with Helicol for work on the pipeline. 92 The contract
negotiation between Consorcio and Helicol took place in Texas. 93
Helicol’s contact with Texas outside of the negotiation included
purchasing helicopters from a Texas company and sending its
employees to the state for training. 94 The Court determined that
Helicol’s contact with Texas was insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over the corporation for wrongful death actions
brought in Texas. Helicol’s employee’s trips to Texas were not
“continuous and systematic” and could therefore not establish
minimum contacts justifying Texas’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction. 95
Shortly after Helicopteros, the Court decided Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 96 where it added the “substantial
connection” requirement to the minimum contacts analysis for a
foreign corporation. 97 In Asahi, the Court held that minimum
contacts with a forum required more than the foreseeability that a
corporation’s product would enter the forum. 98 To establish
personal jurisdiction under a minimum contacts analysis, there
must be a substantial connection between a defendant and the
forum state—this connection only arises from purposeful action
91. See id. at 410 (stating that the flight was part of Helicol’s routine
business of providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies
in South America).
92. See id. (discussing that Consorcio needed Helico helicopters to move
personnel and equipment in and out of the construction area).
93. See id. (noting the Helio’s CEO flew to Houston for the negotiations).
94. See id. at 411 (stating that Helio purchased helicopters and equipment
from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth and sent employees to the Bell plant
for training).
95. See id. at 416 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))
(noting that one trip by the CEO for negotiations was not sufficient contact).
96. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
97. See id. at 112 (determining that the Due Process Clause requires more
than the corporation’s mere awareness that its product enters the forum state
through the stream of commerce).
98. See id. (“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State.”).
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directed toward the forum. 99 Supreme Court decisions continue to
reaffirm that a foreign corporation is a “person” under the Due
Process Clause and that courts must make a finding of minimum
contacts to assert personal jurisdiction. 100
Second, the Court has interpreted constitutional provisions as
applied to aliens. Aliens may be afforded some constitutional
protections, but generally have not received the same level of
protection as U.S. citizens. 101 The Supreme Court has extended
protection to resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause in
the context of discriminatory state welfare laws, 102 and under the
Due Process Clause concerning employment opportunities under
federal hiring regulations. 103 Additionally, the Court recognized
certain constitutional protections for illegal aliens during
post-removal proceedings. 104 These decisions have extended
protection where the conduct occurs within the United States, but
the Supreme Court has refused to extend due process protections
extraterritorially when aliens suffer constitutional rights
violations outside of the United States. 105 In part, this reasoning
stemmed from the idea that extraterritorial matters should be
governed by principles of international law. 106 The dissimilar
99. See id. at 113 (determining that asserting personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation without this substantial connection violates traditional
notions of fair play).
100. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (deciding that for
a U.S. court to have general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, due process
requires that the corporation is essentially “at home” in the forum state (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))).
101. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 136 (noting that while aliens have some
due process protections, they are much “narrower” than protections for citizens).
102. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding “that a
state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens . . . violate[s] the
Equal Protection Clause”).
103. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116–17 (1976)
(determining that the Civil Service Commission Regulations deprived resident
aliens of employment opportunities).
104. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001), superseded by
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (determining that illegal aliens may raise
constitutional challenges during post-removal detention proceedings).
105. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(determining that an alien had no Fourth Amendment protection against a
warrantless search in Mexico because the alien had not developed substantial
connections with the United States).
106. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
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constitutional treatment of foreign corporations and aliens leads to
conflicting interpretations of what entities constitute a “person” for
due process protections. 107
Finally, courts have determined that domestic states are not
“persons” for purposes of due process. 108 The Supreme Court
initially examined this issue in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 109
when South Carolina sought an injunction against the
enforcement of a federal statute, claiming it denied the state’s
right to due process. 110 The Court determined that the definition of
“person” could not be construed to include states. 111 Although
Weltover did not require the Court to determine a foreign state’s
right to due process, the Court cites to Katzenbach in the Due
Process Clause section of the Weltover opinion. 112 Since then,
courts have interpreted this as an indication that the Court did not
intend to extend due process protection to foreign states if it would
not extend the same protection to domestic states. 113 Prior to
Weltover, the Second Circuit’s decision in Texas Trading & Milling
(“[O]perations of the nation in such [foreign] territory must be governed by
treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of
international law.”).
107. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 137 (arguing that the conflict may be
reconciled by treating personal jurisdiction as a limit on U.S. sovereignty,
separate from other rights the constitution provides).
108. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582
F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to treat foreign states and their
instrumentalities as persons under the Due Process Clause); TMR Energy Ltd. v.
State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a
foreign state and its agents are not persons for due process purposes); Price v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the notion that a foreign state is a person under the Fifth Amendment).
109. 383 U.S. 301.
110. See id. at 323 (describing South Carolina’s request for an injunction
against enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
111. See id. (“The word ‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be
expanded to encompass the States of the Union. . . .”).
112. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (declining
to determine if a foreign state is a “person” under due process while recognizing
that precedent refused to acknowledge domestic states as “persons”).
113. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d
393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Weltover did not require deciding the issue because
Argentina’s contacts satisfied the due process requirements . . . but the Court’s
implication was plain: If the ‘States of the Union’ have no rights under the Due
Process Clause, why should foreign states?”).
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Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 114 determined that a foreign
state was entitled to due process. 115 The court, resolving a question
of immunity under the commercial activities exception, required
that the foreign state receive due process scrutiny before the
federal court could assert personal jurisdiction. 116 The Texas
Trading decision pre-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in
Weltover, and in 2009 the Second Circuit decided Frontera
Resources Azerbaijan Corporation v. State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan Republic, 117 taking a different approach to applying
due process to foreign states. 118 In Frontera, the court again
confronted the issue of a foreign state’s right to due process under
the FSIA. 119 The court overruled its holding in Texas Trading in
light of the Weltover decision. 120 The court noted: “[A]bsent some
compelling reason to treat foreign sovereigns more favorably than
‘States of the Union,’ it would make no sense to view foreign states
as ‘persons’ under the Due Process Clause.” 121
Determining the status of a foreign state raises difficult
considerations of a foreign state’s connection with the
Constitution. 122 While the Supreme Court has not spoken
extensively on this issue, some scholarship suggests that foreign

114. 647 F.2d 300 (2d. Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v.
State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009).
115. See id. at 308 (“[E]ach finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA
requires . . . a due process scrutiny of the court’s power to exercise its authority
over a particular defendant.”).
116. See id. (“[T]he [FSIA] cannot create personal jurisdiction where the
Constitution forbids it.”).
117. 582 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009).
118. See id. at 400 (determining that a foreign state is not a “person” under
the Due Process Clause).
119. See id. at 396 (noting that the foreign instrumentality did not dispute
statutory jurisdiction under Section 1608 of the FSIA, rather that the district
court failed to properly establish minimum contacts required for personal
jurisdiction under due process).
120. See id. at 398 (arguing that Weltover stood for the principle that domestic
states are not entitled to due process, therefore foreign states should not receive
due process protection either).
121. Id. at 399 (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
122. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 137 (noting difficult constitutional
considerations as well as foreign policy implications).
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states have no constitutional rights. 123 A number of issues arise
when a foreign state is seen as a “person” under the Constitution—
primarily that a foreign state has no constitutional relationship to
the federal structure. 124 “When, on the other hand, a claim does not
directly confront or conflict with the political branches’ foreign
policy, the federal courts should adjudicate the merits of foreign
state claims by applying constitutional jurisprudence to sustain or
reject the claim.” 125 The Constitution does not explicitly detail how
courts should treat foreign states with respect to the privileges
that the Constitution grants to United States citizens, but it does
anticipate the presence of foreign sovereigns and their involvement
in federal judicial proceedings. 126 Although foreign states are
significantly more engaged in commerce than earlier in history, the
Constitution does not provide that foreign states are to receive the
same treatment as domestic parties. 127
III. The FSIA Commercial Activities Exception: A Legislative
History
The current circuit split between the Ninth and Sixth Circuits
highlights the role that the legislative history plays in courts’
interpretation of the direct effect clause. The issue of personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA becomes clearer in the full context of
the concept of foreign sovereign immunity, the issues with absolute
123. See id. at 137–38 (“[T]he chief reporter for the Restatement [(Third) of
Foreign Relations Law], Professor Henkin, has asserted elsewhere that foreign
states simply ‘have no constitutional rights’ in the United States.”); Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 487 (1987)
(“To the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system of
self-government, permanent outsiders such as foreign states seem to have little
claim to invoke constitutional ‘rights’ against domestic political decisions.”).
124. See Damrosch, supra note 123, at 489 (“[C]onstitutional claims against
the actions of the federal political branches must fail on the merits because of the
relationship of foreign states to the federal structure.”).
125. Id.
126. See Frederick Watson Vaughan, Foreign States are Foreign States: Why
Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due Process
Clause, 45 GA. L. REV. 913, 933 (2011) (describing references to foreign entities in
the Constitution).
127. See id. (noting that the purpose of the Constitution was to provide rights
for citizens, not foreign entities).
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immunity that led to the FSIA, and the purpose behind the
commercial activities exception.
A. Sovereign Immunity in International Law
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity reflects the
fundamental principle of international law that a foreign
government and its instrumentalities shall not be subjected to
another sovereign’s domestic adjudication without its consent. 128
The ideas of sovereign independence of states and the dignity of
coequal sovereigns are central to the notion of immunity. 129
Historically, the doctrine developed as an attempt to strike a
balance of power between the nation-states of Europe. 130 At the
time, the doctrine required states to refrain from action that would
impede another state’s ability to manage its internal affairs. 131
The United States judiciary first recognized foreign sovereign
immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 132 The U.S.
plaintiff brought suit claiming rightful ownership of a vessel owned
by France but found docked in a Philadelphia port. 133 The Court
explained that each nation has exclusive and absolute jurisdiction
over everything in its own territory. 134 However, Chief Justice
128. See Daniel P. Roy III, (Don’t) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity
Baby: The Application of Agency Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2015) (“Sovereign immunity is
understood to naturally flow from the bedrock principles of this system, namely
the inviolability and equality of sovereign states . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
129. See Andrew B. Pittman, Ambassadorial Waiver of Foreign State
Sovereign Immunity to Domestic Adjudication in United States Courts, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 645, 650 (2001) (describing that an exercise of authority over
another state historically signified hostility).
130. See David P. Vandenberg, In the Wake of Republic of Austria v. Altmann:
The Current Status of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 739, 740 (2006) (tracing the initial system of sovereign immunity to
the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia).
131. See id. at 740 (noting that sovereignty was essential to promoting
stability).
132. See 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (determining that a foreign sovereign could
not be subject to another sovereign’s judicial process without consent).
133. See id. at 147 (detailing the seizing of the ship in a Philadelphia port).
134. See id. at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself.”).
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Marshall reasoned that any foreign sovereign coming within the
territory of another foreign sovereign does so under an express or
implied understanding of immunity—to hold otherwise would
compromise the principles of independent sovereign nations. 135
Consequently, the French sovereign owner of the ship was
protected from the jurisdiction of the United States court by an
implied grant of immunity. 136 This decision laid the judicial
framework for recognizing that law and practice of nations
supported granting absolute immunity. 137 This practice continued
for the next century and a half as the United States repeatedly
granted absolute immunity, even as tensions about the doctrine
arose. For example, in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Pesaro, 138 the Court
refused to accept the State Department’s view that the United
States should not grant immunity to foreign vessels engaged in
commerce. 139 The Supreme Court relied on The Schooner Exchange
holding to extend immunity in an action against a merchant ship
owned by the Italian government engaged in commerce in New
York. 140 The Court essentially refuted what the FSIA would later
codify as the commercial activities exception. 141

135. See id. at 137 (“This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike
the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring
extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor
their sovereign rights as its objects.”).
136. See id. at 147 (“[T]he [ship] . . . must be considered as having come into
the American territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily within
it . . . she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.”).
137. See id. at 136 (“All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.”).
138. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
139. See Michael E. Jansen, FSIA Retroactivity Subsequent to the Issuance of
the Tate Letter: A Proposed Solution to the Confusion, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
333, 345 (1989) (noting the rising tension over immunity between the political
and Judicial Branches).
140. See Berizzi Brothers Co., 271 U.S. at 572 (“This full and absolute
territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being
incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.”).
141. See id. (demonstrating the Court’s lack of deference to State Department
wishes).

144

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2019)
B. Concerns Leading to the FSIA

The doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity became
more complicated in the twentieth century with the rise of foreign
states and entities in international commerce. 142 Traditional policy
concerns protecting a state’s military, economic, and political
activities from undue infringement remained valid concerns;
however, as foreign enterprises increasingly entered commercial
trade, private parties had no judicial remedy if a foreign state
harmed their economic interests. 143 Immunity provided an unfair
advantage to foreign states interacting with the private sector. 144
In response, the theory of immunity divided into two distinct
practices. Some states maintained absolute sovereign immunity,
while other states denied immunity in situations where the claim
was commercial or purely private. 145 This second application,
known as the restrictive theory of immunity, emphasized the idea
that immunity should not apply to all types of state action. 146
While the United States still practiced the theory of absolute
immunity, many nations adopted the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, subjecting the United States to suits in the
countries to which it granted immunity. 147
Despite the shift in other states to the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, the federal courts continued to apply absolute
immunity as a way to defer political questions to the Executive
Branch or Congress. 148 In Compania Espanola de Navegacion
142. See Roy, supra note 128, at 1291 (emphasizing increased criticism of
absolute immunity during this time).
143. See Pittman, supra note 129, at 652 (highlighting a shift in contemporary
policy rationales).
144. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986)
(noting the protection foreign states enjoyed in private commerce).
145. See Vandenberg, supra note 130, at 741 (noting that primarily the
European powers began the more restrictive movement).
146. See id. at 742 (describing the commercial and private suits as
nonpolitical state action).
147. See Roy, supra note 128, at 1291–92 (noting the asymmetrical
application of immunity).
148. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not
seen fit to recognize.”); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918) (“The
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Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 149 the Supreme Court declared
that extending sovereign immunity was primarily the right of the
Executive Branch. 150 Generally, the courts would defer to the
Executive’s decision on immunity; however, if the Executive gave
no input, the courts were competent to make their own
determinations. 151
In 1952, Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser of the State
Department, issued a letter, known as the Tate Letter, adopting
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as the Department’s
policy. 152 The driving force behind the adoption was the inequality
that stemmed from applying absolute immunity when so many
other states practiced restrictive immunity. 153 Following the Tate
Letter, the State Department continued to make suggestions to the
courts using a uniform approach of restrictive sovereign
immunity. 154 This process created a problem by allowing the
Executive Branch to have power over judicial procedure. 155 While
prior decisions defaulted to absolute immunity, decisions following
the Tate Letter required courts to consider the State Department’s
recommendation instead of automatically granting absolute

conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to . . . ‘the political’[] departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject
to judicial inquiry or decision.”).
149. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
150. See id. at 74 (“If the claim is recognized and allowed by the Executive
Branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel
upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United States, or
other officer acting under his direction.”).
151. See id. at 76 (proceeding to determine immunity status).
152. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of
State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in
26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; Jansen, supra note 139,
at 334 (describing the letter as the Department’s formal adoption of restrictive
immunity).
153. See Tate Letter, supra note 152, (“[T]he Department feels that the
widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.”).
154. See Vandenberg, supra note 130, at 745 (discussing the impact of using
the same procedure with a different standard).
155. See id. (describing that the State Department had penultimate power
over the courts).
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immunity. 156 If a foreign state did not involve the State
Department, courts made the sole decision on immunity. 157 The
State Department’s recommendations often turned on the identity
of the sovereign defendant, rather than the nature of the claim. 158
Further, the State Department was not legally obligated to inform
parties pursuing a claim against a foreign sovereign that it was
recommending immunity. 159 Varying input on immunity from both
the Judicial and Executive Branches led to unpredictable
decisions. 160 The post-Tate Letter application negatively impacted
the legal standards for immunity, foreign relations, and private
litigants. 161 As foreign states increasingly engaged in commercial
activities resulting in disputes, the State and Justice Departments
urged Congress to act. 162
C. Goals of the FSIA

156. See Yonatan Lupu & Clay Risen, Retroactive Application of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Landgraf Analysis and the Political Question Doctrine,
8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 243–44 (noting that courts had difficulty
distinguishing between a foreign sovereign’s public acts and private acts for
determining immunity).
157. See id. at 244 (emphasizing that State Department intervention was
significant during this period).
158. See Stella Havkin, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The
Relationship Between the Commercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial
Tort Exception in Light of De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 461 (1987) (“Judicial decisions were
influenced so significantly by executive advice that foreign sovereigns often
applied directly to the State Department to acquire a grant of immunity.”).
159. See id. (detailing that plaintiffs were subjected to harm due to a lack of
knowledge).
160. See Lupu & Risen, supra note 156, at 244 (discussing the unclear
rulemaking resulting from split branch intervention).
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 (1976), at 8–9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605 (detailing the conflicting legal input from the Executive and
Legislative Branches, the incentive for foreign states to exert diplomatic
influences, and the uncertainty to private litigants).
162. See David E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining
“a Direct Effect in the United States” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
After Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 261, 267 (1995)
(emphasizing a motivation to eliminate politically motivated, inconsistent
application of immunity).
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Congress passed the FSIA to resolve this growing
inconsistency. The FSIA provides the sole method of obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state. 163 The Act set out to achieve four
main objectives: 164 (1) to codify the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity; 165 (2) to ensure uniform application of
immunity; 166 (3) to provide a statutory procedure for making
service on a foreign state; 167 and (4) to provide relief for a plaintiff
with a judgment against a foreign state. 168 One of the major driving
forces behind passing the FSIA was to transfer decision-making
power from the political branches to the Judicial Branch. 169
The structure of the legislation removed executive influence
and provided principles for courts to use to determine jurisdiction
over claims against foreign states. 170 The structure of the Act
maintains a presumption of immunity against a foreign state. 171
Thereafter, Congress carved out exceptions to the rule, codifying
the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity that not all state
action is out of the reach of United States courts. 172 The Act’s
presumption of immunity, with limited, specific exceptions,
intended to balance providing a remedy for an injured party with
163. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
434 (1989) (determining that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate
Congress’s intent for it to be the sole basis of U.S. court jurisdiction over a foreign
state).
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (stating the urgent need
for the legislation).
165. See id. (noting that the Department of State and U.S. courts had already
adopted the narrower theory of immunity).
166. See id. (highlighting that a key feature of the Act was to transfer
immunity decisions from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch).
167. See id. at 8 (remarking that the Act eliminates the need for the practice
of seizing and attaching the property of a foreign government to obtain
jurisdiction).
168. See id. (restricting the broad immunity in “ordinary commercial
litigation”).
169. See Joseph Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: Reading or Construing the Text, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 563 (2011)
(noting that Congress sought “to depoliticize immunity decisions by vesting them
in courts”).
170. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 717 (2004) (describing
how the structure shifts the decision to the courts).
171. See Dellapenna, supra note 169, at 564 (detailing how Congress
structured the FSIA).
172. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(1)–(5), (b), 1607 (2012).
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avoiding undue intrusion into a foreign state’s affairs. 173
Additionally, the Act sought to protect the State Department from
embarrassing foreign affairs mishaps. 174 Lastly, the Act sought to
overcome inconsistent legal application of immunity, both of
foreign states in domestic courts and for the United States as a
foreign sovereign compared to other states already practicing
restrictive immunity. 175
When Congress determined what types of claims to exclude
from immunity, its primary concern was commercial interaction
between foreign states and United States citizens. 176 Congress
noted that, unlike other legal systems, the United States did not
provide its citizens with a judicial remedy for legal disputes arising
from foreign commercial activity. 177 Accordingly, one of the
exceptions to the FSIA’s general grant of immunity is the
commercial activities exception. 178 The commercial activities
exception was Congress’s response to the increased participation
of foreign state enterprises in global commerce. 179 As a result, the
FSIA broadly defines commercial activity to capture acts ranging
from individual transactions to regular instances of commercial
conduct. 180

173. See Dellapenna, supra note 169, at 564 (describing the two biggest
factors Congress balanced in drafting the FSIA).
174. See id. (noting the potential for embarrassment in doubtful cases).
175. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (“U.S. immunity practice
would conform to the practice in virtually every other country—where sovereign
immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts and not by a foreign affairs
agency.”).
176. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 6 (emphasizing that the
rise of commercial interaction between citizens and foreign states provided the
most pressing need for an exception to immunity).
177. See id. (noting that U.S. law failed to provide a plaintiff with a way to
obtain satisfaction of a final judgment against a foreign state).
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (providing that a foreign state is not
granted immunity for certain commercial activities).
179. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 7 (describing the urgent
need for legislation concerning foreign states in global commerce).
180. See 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”).
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D. The Commercial Activities Exception
The commercial activities exception consists of three clauses
premised on the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 181 Each
clause of the exception defines commercial action not protected by
foreign sovereign immunity. 182 The first clause provides an
exception to immunity when the claim arises from commercial
activity performed within United States territory. 183 The second
clause provides an exception to immunity for an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere. 184 The third clause—the direct effect
clause—provides an exception for the act of a foreign state outside
of the United States that causes a direct effect within the United
States. 185 This clause involves the most attenuated contacts with
the United States of the three clauses. 186 Specifically, the clause
provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States[.] 187

181. See Joseph F. Morrissey, Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: If a Sovereign Acts Like a Private Party, Treat It Like One, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L.
675, 682 (2005) (describing the commercial activities exception as “the heart of
restrictive theory of immunity”).
182. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 18 (stating that the
commercial activities exception as the most important instance where a foreign
state is denied immunity).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the activity to take place in
U.S. territory before a court can assert jurisdiction over the foreign state).
184. See id. (detailing the second clause of the commercial activities
exception).
185. See id. (detailing the third clause of the commercial activities exception).
186. See Working Group of the American Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 555 (2002) (discussing
that the first clause requires conduct partially or wholly in U.S. territory, while
the third clause requires only a direct effect in the U.S.).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
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Congress defined “commercial activity” as “either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act.” 188 By allowing courts to rely on an activity’s
commercial nature in determining immunity, the exception sought
to (1) discourage forum-shopping, and (2) make its application
more effective by preventing a foreign government from claiming
a public purpose for its commercial transactions. 189
The House Report states that commercial activity is subject to
U.S. jurisdiction consistent with the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law. 190 For jurisdiction, the Restatement
dictates that the effect of the conduct must be substantial, and
occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct. 191 The
purpose of requiring the connection to the United States ensures
(1) an appropriate foundation for applying domestic law, and (2)
statutory support for section 1330(a), which permits a court to
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 192
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). It appears Congress intended to define
“commercial activity” broadly. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 16
(“Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial
nature could readily be assumed.”).
189. See M. Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the
“Commercial Activity” Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT’L
LEGAL STUD. 95, 103 (1999) (describing the objectives of the FSIA’s reliance on an
activity’s commercial nature).
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 19 (proscribing jurisdiction
consistent with the Restatement).
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if either[:]
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.
192. See Working Group of the American Bar Ass’n, supra note 186, at 556
(discussing the purpose of the connection requirement).
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In examining the intended jurisdictional reach of the
commercial activities exception, it is useful to examine the
language that Congress used in similar exceptions to the FSIA.
The FSIA provides an exception, commonly referred to as the
noncommercial tort exception, which provides relief for tortious
acts or omissions by a foreign state occurring in the United
States. 193 The statute provides jurisdiction for claims not covered
under the commercial activities exception. 194 This exception
resolves the problem tort victims face in obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign states. 195 Courts have interpreted the noncommercial tort
exception to require a higher standard for jurisdiction—the act
must occur within U.S. territory. 196 Comparison of the express
jurisdictional requirements found in the noncommercial tort
exception and the direct effect clause of the commercial activities
exception supports the contention that if Congress intended
stricter jurisdictional requirements for the direct effect clause, it
would have written it into the statute.
IV. Progression of the Minimum Contacts Analysis
Following the passage of the FSIA, courts disagreed on
defining a “direct effect” and what the Act required to assert
personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court first addressed the
confusion in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 197 concluding
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012) (outlining the exception for a tortious
act or omission of a foreign state).
194. See id.
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of
any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment.
195. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 20–21 (extending the
exception generally to all torts not covered by the commercial activities
exception).
196. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
439 (1989) (limiting jurisdiction under the noncommercial tort exception to events
occurring within United States territory).
197. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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that the direct effect clause did not require foreseeability or
substantiality, only that the effect flowed immediately from the
defendant’s action. 198 The Court did not specifically address
whether a foreign state must possess the requisite minimum
contacts with the United States set forth in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington 199 in order for U.S. courts to assert personal
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the FSIA’s commercial
activities exception. 200 Instead, Weltover merely acknowledged
that if minimum contacts were necessary, the foreign entity in that
case possessed the requisite contacts for personal jurisdiction. 201
Following Weltover, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits reached
opposite conclusions on whether the direct effect clause of the
commercial activities exception to immunity required that a
foreign entity have minimum contacts with the United States. The
Ninth Circuit required that a foreign state possess minimum
contacts before personal jurisdiction was appropriate. 202 However,
the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation, determining that personal jurisdiction was
satisfied without establishing minimum contacts. 203
A. Early Interpretation of the Direct Effect Clause
After the passage of the FSIA, the majority of circuits adopted
a narrower interpretation of activities with a “direct effect” on the
United States. 204 This reading incorporated the “substantial and
foreseeable” elements found in the FSIA’s legislative history’s
198. See id. at 618 (rejecting that the clause imposes a higher standard).
199. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
200. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (stating that the Court would assume,
without deciding, that a foreign state is a person for due process purposes).
201. See id. at 619–20 (determining that the foreign entity established
minimum contacts by issuing debt instruments in U.S. dollars and appointing a
financial agent in New York).
202. See infra Part IV.C (outlining the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
FSIA’s minimum contacts requirement).
203. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s statutory
interpretation of the FSIA’s jurisdictional requirements).
204. See Gohlke, supra note 162, at 274 (noting that while the Second Circuit
adopted the “broad view,” five other circuits that considered cases brought under
the direct effect clause adopted the “narrow view” requiring substantiality and
foreseeability).
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reference to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. 205
The Restatement suggests that jurisdiction is appropriate where
the effect is substantial, or occurs as a direct and foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the Unites States. 206 In Harris Corp. v.
National Iranian Radio and Television, 207 the Eleventh Circuit
was the first of five circuits to adopt this “substantial and
foreseeable” interpretation of the direct effect clause. 208 Harris, a
U.S. corporation, entered into an agreement with National Iranian
Radio and Television (NIRT) for delivery of broadcast transmitters
to Tehran. 209 Shortly after the agreement, Harris was unable to
complete delivery due to the violence that erupted during the
Iranian Revolution. 210 Harris sought a declaratory judgment that
the contract was terminated due to force majeure. 211 NIRT
challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to enter a preliminary
injunction. 212 The court determined that the effects of the contract
in the United States were foreseeable enough to subject NIRT to
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the commercial
activities exception. 213
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted the same standard
in Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of
205. See Nicolas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28
HOUS. L. REV. 629, 639–40 (1991) (describing the prevailing interpretation before
the Weltover decision).
206. See supra note 191 (outlining the Restatement’s jurisdictional
requirements).
207. 691 F.2d 1344 (1982).
208. See id. at 1351 (describing that the clause applies to acts that Congress
would want an American court to hear).
209. See id. at 1346–47 (noting that the agreement contained a provision
releasing the performance guarantee upon termination due to force majeure).
210. See id. at 1348 (stating Harris’s argument that it could not ship to Iran
without a special license issued only in emergency situations or for humanitarian
reasons).
211. See id. at 1348–49 (noting Harris’s inability to ship materials due to the
violent conditions in Iran, thereby forcing Harris to fail to adhere to the contract
terms).
212. See id. at 1349 (stating that the foreign entity claimed it had sovereign
immunity under the FSIA).
213. See id. at 1351 (“The letter . . . extends into this country, and the
appellants’ demands thus have significant, foreseeable financial consequences
here.”).
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Guinea, 214 relying on the legislative history of the FSIA in its
decision to apply the substantial and foreseeable standard. 215 The
case involved a Liechtenstein corporation, Maritime International,
that petitioned a D.C. district court to confirm an arbitration
award against the Republic of Guinea for a breach of contract. 216
Maritime claimed that jurisdiction was proper because a portion of
the contract activities were performed within the United States by
a company, Global, and that Global suffered financial losses upon
breach of the contract. 217
The D.C. Circuit found that there was no direct effect because
the claim was based on conduct not reasonably contemplated by
the commercial activity. 218 Critical to the court’s analysis was an
examination of the legislative history of the direct effect clause,
particularly the reference to Section 18 of the Restatement
(Second) Foreign Relations Law concerning jurisdiction. 219 The
court noted that “[a]lthough section 18 is therefore concerned with
legislative rather than judicial action, Congress’s clear reference
has led some courts to find guidance in section 18’s requirement
that the effect be ‘substantial’ and ‘occur’ as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory.” 220
Following the decision in Maritime International, three other
circuits adopted the substantial and foreseeable test. 221
214. 693 F.2d 1094 (1982).
215. See id. at 1111 (finding clear reference to the Restatement in the FSIA’s
legislative history).
216. See id. at 1096 (noting that the Liechtenstein corporation asserted
jurisdiction under the FSIA).
217. See id. at 1106 (noting that Global maintained an office in Stamford,
Connecticut).
218. See id. at 1111 (“Only if involvement such as Global’s was reasonably
contemplated under the [agreement] can we view as ‘direct’ the injuries resulting
from that involvement.”).
219. See id. at 1110 (examining the portion of the House Report dealing with
jurisdiction of the statute).
220. Id.
221. See Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir.
1988) (determining that an economic injury to a U.S. corporation was a direct
effect where the corporation was the primary victim of the act and the economic
consequences were foreseeable); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111
(5th Cir. 1985) (deciding that the legislative history of the FSIA requires a direct
and foreseeable standard); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329,
332 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984) (determining that the
effects on the immediate family of a U.S. citizen murdered in Iran were not
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The Second Circuit rejected the substantial and foreseeable
standard in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 222 determining that the jurisdictional guidelines in the
FSIA’s legislative history were not applicable to interpreting the
direct effect clause. 223 The case involved the Nigerian
government’s repudiation of contracts with four American
corporations. 224 The Nigerian government sought to increase its
infrastructure for its oil-exporting operations and contracted to
purchase mass quantities of cement. 225 The contracts provided for
a New York bank to make the payments to each corporation
providing the cement. 226 Nigeria drastically overestimated the
amount of cement it could physically accept in its port facilities,
and shortly after the plaintiffs began delivery of the cement,
Nigeria’s ports were overwhelmed and stopped processing the
deliveries. 227 After a few months, Nigeria canceled the contracts
with the cement suppliers, and refused to accept further delivery
or make payment to the corporations. 228 The plaintiff corporations
sued in the Southern District of New York, claiming Nigeria’s
actions constituted anticipatory breaches of the contracts. 229 In

sufficiently direct or foreseeable to assert jurisdiction).
222. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v.
State Oil Co. of Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009).
223. See id. at 311 (finding that Congress relied on principles of jurisdiction
concerning applying American law to conduct overseas, not the proper
extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of American courts).
224. See id. at 303 (noting that all of the plaintiffs’ contracts required
delivering 240,000 metric tons of cement to Nigeria).
225. See id. (stating that the four plaintiffs represented four of the 109
contracts Nigeria executed to obtain mass quantities of cement for its
infrastructure project).
226. See id. at 304 (noting that the actual financial arrangement operated
differently from the terms of the contract, and that the sellers presented
documents for payment to a separate bank in New York).
227. See id. at 305 (stating that while Nigeria’s port facilities could only accept
one to five million tons of cement per year, the government contracted for over
sixteen million tons in eighteen months).
228. See id. at 305–06 (discussing that while forty corporations settled with
the Nigerian government, dozens more sued in courts all over the world).
229. See id. at 306 (noting that the Nigerian government did not contest that
their actions constituted an anticipatory breach).
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response, Nigeria asserted its defense of immunity under the
FSIA. 230
The Second Circuit used the case as an opportunity to dive into
the tangled legislative history of the FSIA—particularly the direct
effect clause of the commercial activities exception. 231 The court
determined that the FSIA’s purpose was not to significantly
restrict jurisdiction, but to standardize the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign states. 232 The opinion rejected the idea that the House
Report’s reference to the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations
Law defined the appropriate jurisdictional reach of the direct effect
clause, calling it “a bit of a non sequitur” because section 18
concerned applying American law overseas. 233 The Second Circuit
determined that when analyzing if a commercial activity had a
direct effect in the United States, the substantial or foreseeable
test was unnecessary; rather the court should ask “was the effect
sufficiently ‘direct’ and sufficiently ‘in the United States’ that
Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the
case?” 234
The Second Circuit’s holding in Texas Trading created a split
with the majority of circuits that adopted requirements of
substantiality and foreseeability. 235 Following the inconsistent
interpretations among the circuits, the Supreme Court provided
guidance on exercising jurisdiction under the direct effect clause in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 236

230. See id. (outlining Nigeria’s assertion that the court did not have personal
jurisdiction).
231. See id. at 307 (“These cases present an opportunity to untie the FSIA’s
Gordian knot, and to vindicate the Congressional purposes behind the Act.”).
232. See id. at 313 (discussing that prior to the FSIA, jurisdiction over foreign
states was irregular and subject to State Department discretion).
233. See id. at 311 (“[Section] 18 concerns the extent to which substantive
American law may be applied to conduct overseas, not the proper extraterritorial
jurisdictional reach of American courts n’importe quelle substantive law.”).
234. See id. at 313 (arguing that a rigid parsing of the direct effect clause leads
to results contrary to the congressional intent to provide U.S. courts jurisdiction
over cases such as this one).
235. See Gohkle, supra note 162, at 279 (discussing the need for a uniform
direct effect test).
236. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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B. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.
In 1992, the Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity on
the application of the direct effect clause in its opinion in Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 237 In Weltover, several bondholders
brought a breach of contract action against the Republic of
Argentina and its central bank arising out of Argentina’s
unilateral extension of the time for payment on bonds issued as
part of a currency stabilization plan. 238 Weltover required the
Court to decide if Argentina’s default on bonds issued as part of its
domestic currency stabilization plan provided an exception to
Argentina’s sovereign immunity under the direct effect clause.
Before the Argentine government and central bank
implemented its plan, Argentine businesses engaged in foreign
transactions using internationally accepted currency instead of the
Argentine currency. 239 To help Argentine businesses access
accepted international currencies, Argentina established a foreign
exchange insurance contract program (FEIC). 240 This program
allowed Argentinian businesses with debt in U.S. dollars to pay the
central bank a contractually predetermined amount of
Argentinian currency. 241 In exchange for the payment, the bank
gave the debtors the U.S. dollars necessary to repay the initial
loan. 242
As the FEIC contracts became due, Argentina did not have
sufficient funds to make the required payments. 243 Argentina’s
solution was refinancing the FEIC debts by issuing government
bonds to the creditors. 244 These bonds provided for payment in U.S.
237. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
238. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 941
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
239. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609 (highlighting that Argentinian currency
was not accepted on the international market).
240. See id. (detailing Argentina’s solution to help its financially struggling
businesses).
241. See id. (noting that Argentina effectively assumed the risk of currency
depreciation in cross-border transactions involving Argentine borrowers).
242. See id. (stating that Argentina offered this exchange regardless of
intervening devaluations).
243. See id. (describing Argentina’s lack of U.S. currency reserves to make
payments on the contracts).
244. See id. (noting that these bonds, called “Bonods,” provided Argentina an
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dollars, and creditors could obtain payment through transfer on
multiple major international markets. 245 When the bonds began to
mature, Argentina still lacked sufficient funds to make the
payments and notified bondholders that the bank would not make
timely payments on the bonds. 246 The Weltover plaintiffs, two
Panamanian corporations and one Swiss bank, refused Argentina’s
delay and substitute bonds, and demanded full payment in New
York. 247 When Argentina did not pay, the plaintiffs brought a
breach of contract action in district court, claiming jurisdiction
under the FSIA commercial activities exception. 248
The controversy required the Supreme Court to evaluate
whether Argentina’s unilateral refinancing created a direct effect
in the United States. 249 The Court turned its attention to the
argument that the FSIA’s legislative history indicates that an act
causes a direct effect only when it is both substantial and
foreseeable. The Court interprets the House Report as a limit on
legislating, not adjudicating, the issue:
That suggestion is found in the House Report, which states that
conduct covered by the third clause of § 1605(a)(2) would be
subject to the jurisdiction of American courts “consistent with
principles set forth in section 18, Restatement of the Law,
Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965). Section 18 states that American laws are not given
extraterritorial application except with respect to conduct that
has, as a “direct and foreseeable result,” a “substantial” effect
within the United States. . . . [T]his obviously deals with
jurisdiction
to legislate rather
than
jurisdiction
to adjudicate . . . . 250

emergency solution to the insufficient funds).
245. See id. at 609–10 (noting that these markets included London,
Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York).
246. See id. at 610 (stating that Argentina unilaterally extended the payment
deadline by Presidential Decree).
247. See id. (detailing that the corporations and bank collectively held $1.3
million in Argentinian bonds).
248. See id. at 611 (describing the commercial activities exception as the most
significant FSIA exception).
249. See id. at 612 (stating what the Court first had to address if the act was
commercial activity before moving on to the direct effect question).
250. Id. at 617–18 (citation omitted).
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While the Court recognized that a foreign entity must cause
more than a trivial effect in order for the direct effect clause to
apply, 251 it declined to hold that the direct effect clause required
substantiality or foreseeability. 252 The Court affirmed the district
court’s determination that an effect is direct if it follows as an
immediate consequence of the foreign entity’s activity. 253
After it defined the meaning of “direct effect” in the United
States, the Court swiftly disposed of the issue of whether the direct
effect clause required a foreign state maintain minimum contacts.
Argentina’s argument centered on the country’s right to
constitutional due process. 254 It argued that a nonresident
defendant was entitled to constitutional due process protection,
and that jurisdiction was appropriate only if it established
minimum contacts by purposefully availing itself of the privilege
of conducting business in the United States. 255 Relying on that
standard, Argentina contended that jurisdiction was improper for
a number of reasons. 256 First, mere foreseeability of being subject
to U.S. court was an inadequate basis for jurisdiction. 257 Second,
the constitutional basis for jurisdiction requires purposeful acts of
the defendant, not just unilateral acts of the plaintiff. 258 According
to Argentina, jurisdiction was improper because the act of calling
251. See id. at 618 (“Of course the generally applicable principle de minimis
non curat lex ensures that jurisdiction may not be predicated on purely trivial
effects in the United States.”).
252. See id. (rejecting to read any unexpressed requirements into the statute).
253. See id. (determining that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the
meaning of “direct”).
254. See Brief for Petitioner, Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
(1992) (No. 91-763), 1992 WL 526250, at *35–36 (“[W]ere the Act construed to
extend jurisdiction to Petitioners’ conduct at issue here, it clearly would run afoul
of the due process limits of the Constitution.”).
255. See id. at *36 (arguing that the Petitioners’ contacts with the forum are
too insubstantial to survive constitutional scrutiny).
256. See id. at *37–39 (arguing that in addition to the constitutional due
process concerns, the FSIA language and legislative history support the notion
that jurisdiction is improper).
257. See id. at *37 (stating that though Argentina could have been aware of
the Respondent’s ability to call for payment in New York, that fact alone does not
provide the necessary contact with the U.S.).
258. See id. (“[T]he Court has made it clear that the unilateral actions of a
plaintiff—whether foreseeable or not—also are an insufficient basis upon which
to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”).
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for payment in New York does not provide the necessary contacts
with the forum. 259 Finally, even if Argentina maintained a
connection with the United States, it was too attenuated for
jurisdictional purposes. 260 Argentina relied on the holding from
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 261 where the Court
determined that jurisdiction was only proper where a defendant
maintained a “substantial connection” with the forum state—this
occurred only when a defendant purposefully directed an action
toward the forum. 262 Argentina’s argument was grounded in the
assumption that the foreign state was entitled to constitutional
due process protections. 263
In response, Weltover contended that Argentina’s argument
improperly merged the requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 264 Respondent’s looked to
the language of the FSIA, arguing that personal jurisdiction under
the direct effect clause did not require a constitutional analysis;
subject matter jurisdiction combined with proper service under the
statute resulted in statutory personal jurisdiction. 265 Weltover
emphasized that Argentina’s due process argument abandoned the
FSIA’s plain language grant of personal jurisdiction in favor of a
constitutional minimum contacts analysis. 266
259. See id. at *37–38 (providing that performing contracts, conducting
negotiations, and having employees constitute valid examples of minimum
contacts).
260. See id. at *37 (arguing that selecting New York as one of multiple options
for payment was not enough to establish contact with the U.S.).
261. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
262. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s
purposeful availment argument).
263. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 254, at *39 (“[Argentina] clearly lacks
the substantial connection with this country required as a constitutional
minimum for jurisdiction.”).
264. See Brief for Respondent, Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
(1992) (No. 91-763), 1993 WL 431511, at *14 (“Apparently recognizing that the
language of the [FSIA] provides them no support, petitioners for the first time in
this Court take the position that the “nexus” reference in the House Report is
identical to the due process requirement for personal jurisdiction.”).
265. See id. at *14–15 (stating that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607 combined with
service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608 grants statutory personal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b)).
266. See id. at *15–16 (“[Argentina’s] effort to abandon the statutory language
of Section 1605(a)(2) in favor of their analysis of personal jurisdiction turns out to
be the equivalent of jumping from the frying pan into the fire.”).
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Because the Court had already determined that Argentina’s
activity was commercial in nature and had a direct effect in the
United States, it did not rule on the minimum contacts test
argument and the constitutional due process challenge. 267 The
Court merely stated that if it were to apply a minimum contacts
evaluation, Argentina’s transactions with the United States were
sufficient for establishing the requisite minimum contacts. 268
This brief portion of the opinion left open the question of what
role, if any, the minimum contacts test has in establishing personal
jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the commercial
activities exception. The lack of clarity on the minimum contacts
requirement set the stage for the current circuit split between the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Minimum Contacts Analysis
In Corzo v. Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, 269 the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its view that granting an exception to
sovereign immunity under the direct effect clause requires a
finding that the foreign sovereign satisfies the minimum contacts
test. In its decision, the court relied on its own precedent in
Security Pacific National Bank v. Derderian, 270 finding that
jurisdiction required the foreign sovereign to maintain minimum
contacts with the United States. 271 Derderian, decided before the
Supreme Court’s Weltover opinion, involved a U.S. bank that sued
to recover for illegal conversion and forgery of a check. 272 The
267. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992)
(“Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the
Due Process Clause . . . we find that Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that
would satisfy the constitutional test.”).
268. See id. at 619–20 (“By issuing negotiable debt instruments denominated
in United States dollars and payable in New York and by appointing a financial
agent in that city, Argentina ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the [United States].’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
269. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).
270. 872 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1989).
271. See id. at 286 (“Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
requirement of a ‘direct effect’ incorporates the minimum contacts standards of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.”).
272. See id. at 282 (stating that the defendant forger obtained $852,000).
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defendant was a foreign bank, owned by the Mexican government,
that accepted gold coins derived from the proceeds of the forged
check. 273 The court determined that the Mexican bank’s
commercial activity was insufficient to cause a direct effect in the
United States. 274 The bank neither had offices or agents, nor was
licensed to do business in the United States; therefore, the
plaintiff’s claim rested solely on the bank’s act of accepting a
deposit which failed to establish minimum contacts. 275 The
Derderian opinion was one of several pre-Weltover decisions that
contributed to the initial inconsistent interpretation of the direct
effect clause. 276
In 2001, The Ninth Circuit examined the minimum contacts
issue again, this time with the guidance of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Weltover. In Corzo, Novotec (Corzo’s predecessor in
interest), was a Peruvian company exporting computers made
primarily from parts imported from the United States. 277 Novotec
brought a lawsuit in Peru against the Banco Central de Reserva
del Peru (BCRP), the monetary authority of Peru. 278 In 1988, the
BCRP introduced a program for Peruvian exporters operating on
the international market who suffered losses as a result of the
exchange rates. 279 The BCRP designed this compensation program
in response to the negative impact that the decline of the Peruvian
dollar had on companies like Novotec. 280 Novotec submitted an
273. See id. (noting that following the forgery, $150,000 was taken from the
U.S. to Mexico and deposited with the Mexican bank).
274. See id. at 286 (determining that if the court found jurisdiction
appropriate in this case, it would subject all foreign sovereign banking
institutions to U.S. jurisdiction merely by accepting funds from account holders).
275. See id. (“Therefore, under a minimum contacts analysis, [the bank’s]
actions did not cause a ‘direct effect’ in the United States, as defined by the
FSIA.”).
276. See infra Part IV.C.1. (detailing the various interpretations of the direct
effect clause among the circuits after the implementation of the FSIA).
277. See Corzo, 243 F.3d at 521 (detailing Novotec’s reliance on U.S. imports).
278. See id. (noting that both parties agreed that the BCRP was “an arm of
the Peruvian government,” immune from U.S. jurisdiction unless an FSIA
exception applied).
279. See id. (stating that the BCRP gave companies the opportunity to apply
to receive government compensation for the losses).
280. See id. (noting that losses occurred when the Peruvian currency declined
between the time of purchase of imported components and the time of exporting
the final product).
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application to the BCRP claiming $400,000 in losses from exchange
rate fluctuations. 281
When the BCRP denied Novotec’s application, Novotec
brought suit in Peru for the original compensation amount plus
interest. 282 The case reached the Supreme Court of Peru, which
affirmed a judgment for Novotec, and Novotec subsequently
assigned its interest to Corzo. 283 Shortly after, the Peruvian
Supreme Court declared its own judgment null and void because
the BCRP had been denied due process. 284 This action was
unprecedented and caused great controversy within the Peruvian
government. 285 Corzo was unable to obtain payment in Peru and
filed a complaint to domesticate a foreign judgment in U.S. district
court, seeking to attach the BCRP’s assets in the United States. 286
Corzo sought to establish jurisdiction under the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA. 287 Corzo initially argued that the
FSIA granted jurisdiction under the first clause of the commercial
activities exception, because the claim was based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
sovereign. 288 Corzo claimed that BRCP’s maintaining assets in the
United States constituted commercial activity. 289 The court swiftly
281. See id. (detailing that in addition to this application, the BCRP had
previously extended a line of credit to Novotec).
282. See id. (stating that Novotec sought recovery for additional losses
incurred after the initial application was filed and denied).
283. See id. (discussing the case’s progress through the Peruvian appellate
system).
284. See id. at 521–22 (describing that the Peruvian Supreme Court admitted
the previous decision was issued by mistake).
285. See id. at 522 (detailing the Resolution of the National Council of the
Judiciary, issued shortly after the decision, that alleges that the justices of the
Peruvian Supreme Court issued a fraudulent judgment).
286. See id. (stating that the complaint alleged that Corzo as Novotec’s
predecessor in interest had a valid and final judgment against the BCRP).
287. See id. at 524 (noting that Corzo also claimed jurisdiction under the FSIA
waiver exception, which the court rejected).
288. See id. at 525 (“His action is ‘based upon’ this activity, Corzo argues,
because he is seeking to attach those assets.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2018) (“A
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.”).
289. See Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525 (9th Cir.
2001) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference
to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
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rejected this argument as the exchange rate transaction was not
commercial in nature. 290
The court then turned to Corzo’s argument that the BCRP’s
refusal to pay caused a direct effect in the United States. Corzo
claimed that the BCRP’s refusal to pay caused a cutoff of cash-flow,
forcing Notovtec to breach contracts with computer companies in
the United States. 291 Using the Weltover standard, the court
determined that any negative impact on companies within the
United States did not flow as an immediate consequence of the
BCRP’s activity. 292 After the court determined that there was no
direct effect, it continued on to address the issue of the BCRP’s
minimum contacts. 293 The court stated an additional requirement
for personal jurisdiction—a foreign sovereign must maintain a
connection with the United States consistent with the
International Shoe minimum contacts standard. 294 Because the
transaction between the BCRP and Novotec occurred entirely
within Peru, the court found no minimum contacts with the United
States and refused to assert jurisdiction under the direct effect
clause of the commercial activities exception. 295
D. The Sixth Circuit’s Plain Language Approach
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the idea that the
direct effect clause of the commercial activities exception required
minimum contacts in its decision in Rote v. Zel Custom
Manufacturing LLC. 296 The plaintiff in Rote suffered severe
by reference to the purpose.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602(d) (2012))).
290. See id. (“The difference is critical, because the denial of the exchange-rate
application was not commercial activity, but a sovereign act.”).
291. See id. (stating that the United States companies injured as a result of
the contract breaches allegedly constituted a direct effect).
292. See id. (noting the effects were secondary or incidental at best) (citing
Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992))).
293. See id. at 525–26 (discussing the required nexus between the activity and
the plaintiff’s cause of action).
294. See id. at 526 (“The fact that United States computer companies might
have been affected by Novotec’s breaches is jurisdictionally irrelevant.” (citing
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
295. Id.
296. See 816 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2016) (determining that incorporating a
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injuries to his right hand after a round of ammunition exploded
upon firing a rifle. 297 The round that exploded came from a box of
ammunition manufactured by Dirección General Fabricaciones
Militares (DGFM). 298 The defective ammunition was purchased
online from Ammoman, a company based in New Jersey. 299
Rote filed a negligence and products liability suit against
DGFM, alleging that DGFM manufactured the ammunition and
introduced it into the stream of commerce. 300 DGFM moved for
dismissal, claiming that it had sovereign immunity as an
instrumentality of the Republic of Argentina. 301 DGFM’s argument
hinged on its assertion that any wrongful act could not cause a
direct effect in U.S. territory because it lacked “substantial”
contacts with the United States. 302 DGFM maintained that the
FSIA’s legislative history demonstrated requirements of minimum
jurisdictional contacts. 303
The court began its minimum contacts analysis by evaluating
the plain language of the direct effect clause. 304 Following the
Supreme Court’s standard in Weltover, the court found it could give
plain meaning to the phrase “causes a direct effect in the
United States” without ambiguity; therefore, probing into the
legislative history was unnecessary. 305 Going further, the court
minimum contacts analysis adds unnecessary requirements to the statute).
297. See id. at 387 (noting that the plaintiff received proper loading and firing
instructions).
298. See id. (identifying the source of the ammunition).
299. See id. (noting that “[t]he complaint does not indicate from whom
Ammoman purchased the ammunition”).
300. See id. (stating that the plaintiffs also alleged that DGFM defectively
designed the rounds to have a protruding primer and that DGFM failed to provide
adequate warnings).
301. See id. (noting DGFM’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
302. See id. at 391 (“In other words, DGFM asserts that subject-matter
jurisdiction is only proper if personal jurisdiction over the foreign state complies
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
303. See id. at 391–92 (detailing DGFM’s argument that jurisdictional
prerequisites found elsewhere in the law are interconnected with the FSIA’s
jurisdiction).
304. See id. at 392 (“If the language of the statute is clear, then the inquiry is
complete, and the court should look no further.” (quoting Brilliance Audio, Inc. v.
Haights Cross Commc’n, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007))).
305. See id. at 393 (noting that though the statute does not define the terms,
the court will give them ordinary meaning if possible).
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emphasized, “[E]ven if we do look at legislative history, DGFM’s
argument is still unpersuasive where the legislative history is
being used to inject into the statute additional ‘unexpressed
requirement[s],’ rather than resolve any inherent ambiguity.” 306
Comparing its decision to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Weltover, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court similarly
rejected a foreign instrumentality’s argument that required
reading into the legislative history to find requirements of
substantiality and foreseeability in applying the direct effect
clause. 307
The Sixth Circuit expressly critiqued the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation in Corzo, finding it overreaching and
unpersuasive. 308 The court stressed that the Ninth Circuit followed
precedent
that
was
inconsistent
with
Weltover:
“Derderian pre-dates Weltover, and so the court did not have the
benefit of Weltover’s admonishment that we must not read
‘unexpressed requirements’ into the statute.” 309 Thus, following
the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 decision, courts remain split on whether
the direct effect clause of the commercial activities exception
requires a minimum contacts analysis.
V. Eliminating the Minimum Contacts Analysis
The direct effect clause of the FSIA commercial activities
exception should not require that a foreign state possess minimum
contacts with the United States before a federal court can assert
personal jurisdiction. Two considerations support excluding the
minimum contacts analysis. First, constitutional protections
should not extend to foreign states. Second, incorporating a
minimum contacts analysis is contrary to the purpose of the
306. Id. (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)).
307. See id. (“The Supreme Court . . . found that legislative history inapposite
and rejected the idea that the Act intended an ‘unexpressed requirement of
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability.’’” (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607, 618 (1992))).
308. See id. at 395 (“In reading the ‘direct effect’ element, the Ninth Circuit
went beyond the plain meaning of the FSIA’s terms and relied on the same
legislative history we reject to read into the statute requirements that are simply
not there.”).
309. Id.
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commercial activities exception. In an applicable future case, the
Supreme Court should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the
direct effect clause does not require a minimum contacts analysis.
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Rote v. Zel Custom Manufacturing
LLC 310 correctly denies due process protection to a foreign state
and accomplishes the purpose of the commercial activities
exception—providing U.S. courts with the opportunity to
adjudicate claims where Congress has expressly lifted a foreign
state’s immunity.
A. A Foreign State is Not a “Person” Under the Due Process
Clause
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Corzo v. Banco Central de
Reserva del Peru 311 that personal jurisdiction under the direct
effect clause requires minimum contacts relies on an assumption
that the Due Process Clause applies to foreign states. 312 A foreign
state should not be considered a “person” for the purposes of due
process; therefore, it is improper to extend it due process
protection. Although the Supreme Court has examined applying
the Due Process Clause to nontraditional entities, its analysis of
domestic states provides the most helpful comparison. 313 A foreign
state should not receive constitutional protections that are denied
to domestic states. 314 The Supreme Court’s decision in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach 315 declined to extend due process
protection to domestic states. 316 The Court could not justify
interpreting “person” under the Due Process Clause to include a
state. 317 If the Court cannot reasonably interpret “person” to
310. 816 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016).
311. 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).
312. See id. at 526 (finding that personal jurisdiction was improper where the
foreign sovereign had not established minimum contacts with the United States).
313. See supra Part II.B (outlining previous decisions applying due process
protection to foreign corporations, aliens, and domestic states).
314. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
rejection of South Carolina’s argument that it was entitled to due process).
315. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
316. See supra note 110 (discussing South Carolina’s argument that the
Voting Rights Act deprived the state of due process).
317. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24 (determining that no court could
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include a domestic state, it follows that a foreign state is also
excluded from the definition of “person” under the Due Process
Clause. When the Court in Weltover briefly addressed the concept
of applying due process to a foreign state, it declined to make a
decision; however, it referenced the Katzenbach decision, implying
that the holding denying personhood to domestic states should also
apply to foreign states. 318 Several federal circuit courts have
followed this line of reasoning when declining to extend due
process to foreign states. 319 It is inconsistent to extend
constitutional protection to foreign states while at the same time
declining to provide the same protection to domestic states. 320 The
Second Circuit recognized this discrepancy when it overruled its
own precedent in Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corporation v.
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic, 321 where it determined
that no compelling reason justified treating a foreign state as a
“person” while simultaneously denying domestic states the same
status. 322
Second, extending due process protection to foreign states is
contrary to the structure of the Constitution and how foreign states
relate to the federal structure. 323 The Constitution anticipates
foreign states participating in the U.S. judicial process, and Article
III provides federal courts jurisdiction over a foreign state. 324
When the political branches have not spoken on a particular issue,
it may be beneficial for a federal court to apply constitutional

construe the definition of person to include a state).
318. See supra note 112–113 (discussing how federal courts have interpreted
the portion of the Weltover opinion dealing with foreign states as persons).
319. See supra note 86 (listing courts that have declined to extend a minimum
contacts analysis to a foreign state under the FSIA).
320. See Halverson, supra note 88, at 141 (arguing that not recognizing a
foreign state as a “person” under the Due Process Clause is consistent with policy
and case precedent).
321. 582 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009).
322. See supra notes 114–121 and accompanying text (outlining how the
Second Circuit reevaluated its interpretation of “person” applied to foreign
states).
323. See supra Part II.B (discussing issues that arise when foreign states
receive constitutional protections).
324. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting judicial authority over claims
between a U.S. state or citizen and a foreign state).
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considerations to a foreign state. 325 However, both the Executive
and Legislative Branches expressly stated concerns about
over-extending foreign sovereign immunity. 326 The State
Department issued the Tate Letter in response to concerns over
inconsistent application of immunity over foreign states. 327 The
Department recognized an inherent unfairness in allowing all
foreign state action to evade adjudication in U.S. courts. 328 The
Tate Letter’s advocacy for the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity was a key contributing factor in Congress adopting the
FSIA. 329 The FSIA maintained a presumption of immunity for the
majority of foreign state action; however, when Congress weighed
the benefits of foreign immunity against potential injuries to U.S.
citizens, there were circumstances where it found immunity
unjustified. 330 These exceptions, including the commercial
activities exception, indicate Congress’s intent to promote the
interests of U.S. citizens over the goals of sovereign immunity in
these limited contexts. 331 Because the political branches expressed
the appropriate application of foreign sovereign immunity, it is
unnecessary for the Court to extend constitutional provisions to a
foreign state.
Disqualifying a foreign state as a “person” under the Due
Process Clause eliminates the need for a minimum contacts
analysis to assert personal jurisdiction under the direct effect
clause. Instead, a plain reading of the statute resolves the question
of personal jurisdiction. The FSIA succinctly states requirements
325. See Damrosch, supra note 123, at 496 (noting that benefits include
promoting constitutional principles in the global context and fostering good
relations with foreign states).
326. See supra Part III.B–C (outlining the Executive Branch’s concerns over
absolute sovereign immunity and Congress’s response by adopting the FSIA).
327. See supra notes 152–154 (discussing the State Department’s unilateral
action to adopt restrictive application of immunity to reduce unfairness).
328. See Tate Letter, supra note 152 (arguing that increased foreign
government commercial activity required U.S. courts to determine parties’ rights
and obligations).
329. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 8 (highlighting that the
State Department faced the awkward position of interjecting into immunity
litigation already before the courts).
330. See supra Part III.C (detailing the structure of the FSIA and its
exceptions).
331. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that providing
plaintiffs with a judicial remedy was one of four major goals of the FSIA).
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for both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. First, federal
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any claim for
relief arising under one of the FSIA exceptions. 332 Once subject
matter jurisdiction is established, personal jurisdiction exists so
long as the foreign state is properly served according to the
requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 333 Personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state is limited by requiring an initial finding of subject
matter jurisdiction under one of the enumerated FSIA
exceptions. 334 Foreign states have an additional procedural
safeguard in that an appearance does not confer personal
jurisdiction for purposes of the FSIA exceptions. 335
The Sixth Circuit’s decision properly dismissed the foreign
defendant’s assertion the FSIA’s legislative history entitled it to
personal jurisdiction only if it complied with the Due Process
Clause. 336 In rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit
appropriately
denied
reading
in
additional
statutory
requirements. 337 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Corzo incorrectly
considers the legislative history of the FSIA instead of adopting
the unambiguous statutory requirements. Because the language in
the FSIA is clear and sufficient to give courts proper subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to draw inferences
about personal jurisdiction from the legislative history.

332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction . . . to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this
title or under any applicable international agreement.”).
333. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012) (granting personal jurisdiction so long as
service is made in accordance with section 1608). Section 1608 outlines four ways
to serve a foreign state, including service on an authorized agent or use of an
international convention on service of documents. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2018).
334. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (conditioning a finding of personal jurisdiction on
an initial finding of subject matter jurisdiction).
335. See id. (denying personal jurisdiction over a foreign state by appearance
outside of the context of the FSIA claim).
336. See Rote, 816 F.3d at 392–93 (determining that the defendant’s reading
was inappropriate because the statute was unambiguous).
337. See id. at 393 (refusing to insert additional requirements where it would
not resolve any ambiguity).
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B. Applying a Minimum Contacts Analysis is Contrary to the
Structure and Purpose of the Direct Effect Clause
The FSIA provides blanket immunity for foreign states in U.S.
courts. Congress included a number of exceptions to this
immunity. 28 U.S.C § 1605 of the FSIA, which provides six general
exceptions to immunity, reflects the important shift from an
absolute to a restrictive theory of foreign immunity. 338 These
exceptions capture circumstances where Congress determined that
protecting the interests of U.S. citizens outweighed the
long-standing principle of foreign sovereign immunity. 339 The
exceptions are narrow and a claim against a foreign state only
moves forward when expressly authorized by the statute. 340
Requiring minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction creates
a burden for U.S. plaintiffs not contemplated by Congress. The
commercial activities exception demonstrates Congress’s
recognition that the commercial acts of foreign states have the
potential to damage U.S. citizens. 341 The exception intended to
provide relief for plaintiffs who had no judicial recourse against a
foreign government who caused harm after entering into private
commerce. 342
A review of the structure of the commercial activities
exception, as well as other FSIA exceptions, demonstrates that
Congress intended a less restrictive jurisdictional requirement for
the direct effect clause. 343 The first clause of the commercial
activities exception dictates a territorial connection—specifically,
that the act must have taken place in part or in whole within
338. See supra Part III.B (discussing how increased interaction between U.S.
citizens and foreign states rendered the theory of absolute immunity
unworkable).
339. See supra note 176 (stating that foreign commercial activity was
Congress’s most pressing concern).
340. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983)
(“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one
of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”).
341. See supra Part III.D (detailing Congress’s motivation for adopting the
commercial activities exception).
342. See supra notes 176–180 (noting that Congress’s primary concern when
drafting the exceptions was foreign states’ commercial activity).
343. See supra notes 182–187 (detailing the jurisdictional differences in the
three clauses of the commercial activities exception).
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United States territory. 344 The second clause covers conduct in the
United States that relates to commercial conduct abroad. 345 Unlike
the first two clauses, the direct effect clause does not dictate a strict
territorial requirement and provides for jurisdiction over
commercial acts with less significant contact. 346 It follows that the
direct effect clause does not require minimum contacts, rather it
requires what is clearly written in the statute: that an act cause a
direct effect in the United States. Congress was aware of the
significance of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, and
included additional jurisdictional requirements where it deemed it
necessary. 347 For example, the FSIA noncommercial tort exception
specifically requires that the conduct occurs within United States
territory—subject matter jurisdiction under this exception
explicitly excludes extraterritorial conduct. 348 However, when
Congress drafted the direct effect clause of the commercial
activities exception, it chose to require only subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction through proper service. 349
Though the reference to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations in the legislative history mentions requirements of
substantiality and foreseeability, 350 Congress chose not to include
those elements in the statute. These examples demonstrate that
Congress used its discretion to impose a lesser jurisdictional nexus
than minimum contacts under the direct effect clause.

344. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 161, at 17 (“It will be for the courts
to determine whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in
whole or in part in the United States. This definition, however, is intended to
reflect a degree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship or
U.S. residence of the plaintiff.”).
345. See id. at 19 (noting that although some of this activity overlaps with the
first clause, it is advisable to expressly provide for the case where a claim relates
to a commercial activity abroad).
346. See supra note 186 (describing the direct effect clause as requiring the
lowest threshold of contact with the United States for jurisdiction).
347. See supra note 196 (providing that the noncommercial tort exception
permits jurisdiction only for conduct within U.S. territory).
348. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text (noting the stricter
jurisdiction requirements for the noncommercial tort exception).
349. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
jurisdiction requirements for the commercial activities exception).
350. See supra notes 190–192 (discussing the Restatement’s purpose of
requiring the connection to the U.S. before allowing jurisdiction).
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rote appropriately interprets
what constitutes a direct effect by adhering to the plain text of the
clause. 351 The Supreme Court determined in Weltover that an
effect is direct where “it follows as an immediate consequence of
the defendant’s activity.” 352 Adopting the same reasoning, the Rote
court found the language of the statute unambiguous, therefore
reading
in
additional
jurisdiction
requirements
was
unnecessary. 353 Contrarily, the Ninth Circuit decided Corzo
according to precedent set before the Supreme Court gave its
guidance in Weltover on the proper interpretation of the direct
effect clause. 354 The Ninth Circuit’s view rests on an outdated
interpretation of the direct effect clause made at a time where the
clause caused great confusion and the circuit courts struggled to
come to a uniform conclusion. 355 The Corzo court’s holding did not
take into consideration the more recent guidance provided by
Weltover on properly interpreting the direct effect clause. 356
Although the Supreme Court in Weltover did not make an express
finding on the minimum contacts standard, it did provide guidance
on the appropriate method of interpretation of the direct effect
clause. 357 Therefore, the Court should definitively resolve the issue
by following the Rote court’s plain language interpretation to hold
that establishing minimum contacts is not a necessary
requirement for personal jurisdiction under the direct effect
clause.

351. See Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, 816 F.3d 383, 392 (2016) (finding that
the operative words in the statute were unambiguous).
352. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
353. See supra note 307 (explaining that the Rote court made its
determination in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidance).
354. See Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525–26
(2001) (affirming the court’s own precedent that the direct effect clause required
minimum contacts).
355. See supra Part IV.A (discussing inconsistencies in the initial
interpretations of the direct effect clause).
356. See supra notes 308–09 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit disregarded the
Supreme Court’s guidance not to read unexpressed requirements into the
statute).
357. See supra notes 249–52 (stating that the clause is properly interpreted
using a plain reading of the statute).
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VI. Conclusion

The direct effect clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities
exception provides the only opportunity to hold foreign states
accountable for those commercial acts occurring outside of U.S.
territory. Providing foreign states with constitutional protections,
or reading additional jurisdictional requirements into the
language of the direct effect clause, precludes U.S. plaintiffs from
the only path to a remedy for injuries caused by the foreign state.
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit’s plain language
interpretation of the direct effect clause of the commercial
activities exception properly denies due process protection to
foreign states while carrying out the purpose of the FSIA.

